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Abstract: The question of the universality of human rights has much in common with the
question of the universality of ethics. In the form of a multidisciplinary reflexive survey, the aim
of this article is to show how human rights discourses derive from more basic principles related
to basic needs. These needs are the universal  grammar for moral principles,  which will  be
distinguished from ethical norms. Ethical norms, I will argue, are rules that develop in social
groups to put into effect moral principles through communicative action and therefore develop
as culturally specific norms, which guide behaviour within these social groups. This will explain
why ethical norms contain some universal principles, but are largely culturally specific. In order
to shed some light on the universality debate, I will show how moral principles translate into
ethical norms and might manifest through communicative action in human rights law. For this
purpose the article develops a socio-legal account on social norm-creation that bridges moral
universality and legal universality via ethical pluralism, which in effect explains why despite the
universality of moral principles, the outcomes of ethical rationales can vary extremely.
Keywords: discursive action; ethical pluralism; human rights; moral universalism
1. Introduction
In  many  ways  natural  rights  have  found  their  way
back into common discourse. Statements of politicians
and even court decisions account for that. This trend
parallels  the  belief  that  human rights  are  universal.
Such a conviction is fundamentally rooted in the belief
of an existence of universal moral principles. However,
cultural  pluralists  reject  the  belief  of  universality  of
morals;  their  most lenient  position is  that,  although
morals are different all over the world, in discourse we
might find some common principles on which we all
can agree. This article aims to give a socio-legal account
of  these  positions  that  bridges  moral  universalism
understood  in  relation  to  basic  needs  and  legal
universalism based on universal  agreement between
states  in  an  interdisciplinary  manner.  While  the
individual  debates  traced  herein  are  quite  well
known,  they  usually  take  place  apart  from  each
other. This article tries to place these debates in a
broader  socio-legal  framework  functioning  as  a
conceptional link. The argument that this socio-legal
account puts forth is then that due to our common-
ness  in  needs  and  vulnerabilities  we  all  share
common moral  principles  (moral  universalism);  but
due to different mechanisms to protect from threats
to  needs  and  to  alleviate  vulnerabilities,  which
developed differently within different cultures, ethical
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norms  are  not  universally  the  same,  but  on  the
contrary are very different (ethical pluralism); even-
tually, through international  ethical discourse states
are able to negotiate norms that are universally valid
on  legal  grounds  based  on  the  acceptance  of  all
states (legal universality). In this manner, this essay
creates  a  link  between  these  three  conceptions
about  universality versus plurality and thereby con-
stitutes a  reinterpretation of Thomas Paine's distinc-
tion between natural rights and civil rights adapted to
a globalized world.  The arguments will  refer  to ad-
vancements  in  cognitive  psychology concerning em-
pathy and will be placed in a socio-legal framework on
social norm-creation.
Section 2 will use human rights to exemplify three
things:  (a)  that  human  rights  are  not  themselves
universal moral principles, but are based on culturally
specific ethical norms; (b) that human rights can only
claim  legal  universality  based  on  acceptance  by
states; and (c) that human rights by themselves have
become  a  culture  for  human  rights  lawyers  and
activists.  This results  in the phenomenon that  even
within the same culture, human rights advocates have
distanced  themselves  from  the  popular  opinion  of
large portions of society and/or from politicians about
what constitutes ethical conduct. Section 3 will  then
briefly elaborate on norms that some authors accept as
universally valid and continue with the example of "the
prohibition of torture". Building on Wittgenstein's con-
ception of depth grammar, the cultural grammar under-
lying the very foundations of language, the article will
explain  how  cultures  give  their  own  coloration  to
discourses,  which  leads  to  a  differentiation  between
universal moral principles and culturally specific ethical
norms (a distinction between morals and ethics) [1].
Based on psychology of human motivation (related to
needs) and cognitive research on neurological founda-
tions  of  language  acquisition,  empathy  and  moral
development (i.e. mirror neurons),  Section 4 will  ex-
plain  how social-norm creation  can  be seen  from a
socio-legal perspective. Section 5 will then develop the
socio-legal account based on the case of the prohibition
of torture. Eventually, this article will contribute to the
larger  debate  with  a  structural  explanation  on  how
societies tend to re-evaluate already established ethical
norms in the face of events with great moral impact.
Moral  principles  and  ethical  norms,  be  it  their
universal application, their ethnocentric roots or their
cultural interpretations, are a product of an extensive
canon of post-Enlightenment ideas drawn from a rich
variety of sources. This article reflects on these sources
and tries to revisit the salient parts of some of these
ideas by tying them together into one larger account
of  social  norm-creation.  By  having  to  draw  on  a
variety of abiding debates and case material, explor-
ing their  inner logic,  and testing them against their
equally colourful background from which they derive,
this essay obviously faces the challenge to revive well
known themes without becoming to superficial, while
at the same time drawing the bigger picture of how,
in the author's account, societies come from  a priori
morals  to human rights.  Thereby,  this  essay essen-
tially aims to reconcile the universalist with the plural-
ist worldview through the use of theoretical elabora-
tions on language, empathy and social norm-creation.
The  here  presented  account  is  then  one  of  how
initially  universal  moral  principles  pertaining  to  the
protection  of  individuals  and  of  social  groups  from
harm  become  culturally  coloured  and  emerge  as
culturally specific ethical norms. These ethical norms
can become universal again only through international
consensus.  At  this  stage  these  ethical  norms  have
absorbed  many  culturally  specific  assumptions  that
their  acceptance is  often disputed.  The overarching
objective of this essay is to lay the groundwork for
future questions in the study of politics and ethics that
aim  to  go  beyond  the  contemporary  tendency  of
scholarship to give priority to certain ethical concepts
such  as  justice,  whilst  ignoring the  canon  of  other
concepts  such  as  beneficence,  magnanimity,  mercy
etc. as well  as the pertaining question of vices and
evil in international politics.
2. Non-Universality of Human Rights
Let  me  now turn  the  attention  to  the  legal  debate
about  universality,  specifically  with  regard  to  human
rights.  Although  this  generalizes  the  subject  greatly,
one can make the classic distinction between natural
law and positive law with regards to human rights as
well.  Thomas Paine  made the distinction  between  a
priori given natural rights of persons and of a posteriori
given civil rights (read: human rights) when stating:
"Natural rights are those which appertain to man in
right  of  his  existence.  Of  this  kind  are  all  the
intellectual rights, or rights of the mind, and also
all  those rights of  acting as an individual for his
own  comfort  and  happiness,  which  are  not
injurious to the natural rights of others. Civil rights
are those which appertain to man in right of his
being a member of society. Every civil right has for
its foundation some natural right pre-existing in the
individual  but  to  the  enjoyment  of  which  his
individual  power  is  not,  in  all  cases,  sufficiently
competent. Of this kind are all those which relate
to security and protection." [2]
In response to an attack on the principles of the
French  Revolution  in  the  House  of  Commons  by
Edmund  Burke,  Thomas  Paine  formulated  the  first
part of the Rights of Man. He postulated civil rights as
having their basis in natural rights; but he was also
clear that these rights may not be fully enjoyed unless
supported and protected by the state. This perspective
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is  very representative of the 'natural  law branch' of
legal scholarship, which assumes that  humans are to
the  same  extent  entitled  to  the  same  rights.  The
natural law approach argues in different ways for a
common morality that is  enshrined either in human
nature,  human  dignity,  nature,  or  god  given  law,
which in turn results in natural rights [3]. The natural
law discourse is particularly tempting nowadays as it
assumes a close connection to human rights. This is
apparent in many writings and a very common state-
ment is: "we are all humans thus we all have the same
human rights" (for similar statements and annotations
see [4]). The statement demonstrates how language is
used to connect two concepts, which are not necessar-
ily married, by bridging the logical gap between being
human and having rights through attaching the label
'human' to rights. Such rhetoric can lead to a wrong
explanatory  mechanism  of  why  natural  rights  may
result in human rights. Paine's perspective is particu-
larly  valuable  with  regard  to  the  social  mechanism
pertaining to security and protection. Paine's perspect-
ive  is  different  from  Henry  Shue's  consequentialist
argument for universality that certain rights (three in
his case, eight in the case of Talbot [5]) are prerequis-
ites because they ensure the enjoyment of other rights
and protect against standard threats [6].
To a large extent this concealed retreat to natural
law via rhetorical logic follows the intuitive feeling that
there is some commonness—a universal morality. Many
contemporary legal  scholars (particularly of a contin-
ental European legal tradition) have, concerning univer-
sality  of  human  rights,  assumed  the  perspective  of
legal positivism, since natural law is considered to be
outdated  [7].  On  the  other  hand,  one  of  the  most
common references of 'legal rationalists' to be found
derives from Kant's categorical imperative in one way
or the other. Legal positivism essentially states that law
is distinct from morality as it  is  simply a result  of a
process rooted in the legal system. Law does therefore
not derive its validity from being morally right or just,
but  from  being  the  result  of  a  correctly  followed
procedure. Hart strongly defended this position and the
need for a distinction between 'law as is' and 'law as
ought',  trying to  separate the legal  sphere from the
moral sphere. He reiterates his position by the help of
two utilitarians, Austin and Bentham, who "insisted on
the need to distinguish firmly and with the maximum of
clarity,  law as it  is  from law as it  ought to be.  This
theme haunts  their  work,  and  they  condemned the
natural-law thinkers precisely because they had blurred
this apparently simple but vital distinction" [8]. Even
though one of  the  major  works  on legal  positivism,
Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law, is a tribute to Kant's Cri-
tique of the Pure Reason, Kelsen rejects what he calls
empty  formulas  ('inhaltsleere  Formeln')  such  as  the
categorical imperative and the golden rule as basis of a
principle  of  justice,  because  these  formulas  make
justice  subject  to  what  one  is  willing  to  accept  for
oneself [9].
However, the principle of justice, which is commonly
filled with natural legal assumptions, always finds its
way back even into positive law through legal principles
and the margin of appreciation of judges. One could
further argue that law, because it is a matter of social
agreement (within the right procedures and ultimately
also about the right procedures), is  always culturally
specific. Such an argument would make legal positivism
a relative of moral pluralism. Nevertheless, the differ-
ence  is  that  legal  positivism  can  explain  universal
human rights by referring to its universal acceptance
through ratification by states. This is quite important
because it  distinguishes morality from law and intro-
duces  the  idea  of  a  universal  discourse,  which  can
result in consent about the formulation of a treaty and
in  acceptance  by  ratification.  The  universality  then
results not from being universally true but from being
universally accepted—a legal universality.
With regard to cultural relativism in legal discourses
the following arguments can be seen as examples of
the  overall  perspective  on  Non-Western  critique  of
human rights law (for a very elaborate account on dif-
ferent arguments why human rights are a particularly
Western  concept  see  [10]).  In  Vedic  and  Confucian
traditions, critics of universality of human rights con-
tend that duties towards the group are more important
than rights of the individual against the group. In other
words,  Confucian  virtues  of  order,  obedience,  and
respect for authority are seen as justly limiting human
rights as a sacrifice of a few for the benefit of many
[11]. The Singapore School on Human Rights does not
reject human rights  per se, but it rejects the Western
values in them that derive from cultural and historical
developments of Europe and the US. At the same time,
the Singapore School criticizes the West for applying
double  standards  and  pursuing  its  own political  and
economic agenda in the fight for human rights ([12],
pp. 36–37).  Out of the desire to "Africanize" human
rights,  African  states  established  their  own  human
rights regime. The African human rights discourse as
manifest in the African Charter of Human and Peoples'
Rights is very explicit about collective rights of groups
and peoples: Art. 18—family rights to protection, Art.
19—equality of peoples, Art. 20—right to self-determin-
ation, Art. 21—peoples' right to freely dispose of their
wealth and natural resources, Art. 22—peoples' right to
economic,  social  and cultural  development, Art.  23—
right to peace and security, Art. 24—right to a satisfact-
ory environment ([12], p. 93). In terms of mechanisms
of  community  survival  it  reflects  a  complex of  com-
munal entitlements and obligations, which are grouped
around concepts such as respect, restraint, responsibil-
ity and reciprocity [11].
Another  non-Western  approach  would  be  the  Is-
lamic discourse on the universality of human rights,
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which  can be divided into  three  branches:  (1)  one
that sees Islamic law as the perfect protection against
human rights violations; (2) another approach that is
aware of  the differences and claims impossibility  of
full compatibility; and (3) yet another approach that
suggests  the  possibility  of  applying  the  concept  of
margin of  appreciation, i.e.  a measure of  discretion
allowing states to take into account particular national
circumstances [13], in human rights law and also pro-
poses applying the Islamic equivalent to this concept
(welfare:  maslahah)  to  mitigate  between  cultural
differences (for more detailed elaborations see [12,14,
15]).  Radical  cultural  relativism finds  support  in the
second position: "Western condemnations of discrimina-
tion against women in other regions are said to reflect
an insensitive, ethnocentric approach to rights issues,
which is linked to cultural imperialism" [16]. One of
the  less obvious  (but  very  important)  differences is
that Islamic law is a combination of individual duties
and  community  duties  (five  pillars  of  Islam,  e.g.
charity enforced by a poor-due tax, zakat) and entitle-
ments of classes (for  zakat the destitute and needy)
that  try  to  ensure  a  stable  society  and  not  the
assertion of individual rights and freedoms [17].
There is one particularly strong argument against
the  universality-of-principles  perspective  on  human
rights:  what  a  social  group  perceives  as  right  and
wrong  in  terms  of  human  rights  might  differ  from
universally accepted human rights based on different
values  that  are  applied  in  a  local  cultural  setting.
These values of the social group are derivatives of its
own social and historical context. In this regard uni-
versality of human rights can thus only be understood
as the consent  of  states as representatives of  their
citizen  to  be  bound  by  certain  norms.  Different
cultures, the argument continues, do not intrinsically
nor  inherently  refer  to  a  common  conception  of
human rights but rather to what Donnelly alludes to
as human dignity, which makes them only seemingly
the same [18]. Using similar labels, such as morality
and human rights  or  even the  same term such as
'human  dignity' does  not  necessarily  result  in  a
compatibility of the underlying value hierarchies that
try to ensure need fulfilment of a social group and the
protection  from harm  in  different  cultural  contexts.
Even within the same state the ordinary citizen and
the  human  rights  lawyer  might  come  into  dispute
over human rights that are not in harmony with the
moral sentiment of the public, as the following cases
demonstrate.
As a concrete example of the difference between
popular  ethical  intuition and legal  argument  serves
the protest of politicians with regards to a decision of
the German Constitutional  Court that shooting down
a plane which aims at a populated area would violate
the individual right to life and human dignity of the
passengers.  The  court  defended  its  anti-utilitarian
perspective  with  the  argument  that  one  could  not
assume that  innocent  passengers  would  consent  to
give their life for others just by boarding a plane [19]
(see  also  [20]).  Another  example  is  the  "Mauer-
schützen" trials (the Berlin wall shooting trials) in Ger-
many. After the German reunion, the German Highest
Court  circumvented  the  prohibition  of  retroactive
penal law by arguing that East-German soldiers, who
shot people trying to cross the Berlin wall (before the
reunification)  and  went  unpunished  in  Eastern-Ger-
many, violated law common to all nations. Obviously,
this law was not common to all  nations; thus legal
scholarship (contrary to the general public) criticized
the court of having brought back natural law into the
legal positivist tradition of Germany and connecting it
with  human  rights  law  through  the  backdoor  of
Radbruch's formula ([21]; concerning the natural law
argument  see  also  [22]).  Eventually  the  European
Court of Human Rights followed the German Highest
Court in its opinion [23].
Yet  another  instance  of  how  different  national
courts  in  comparison  to  the  popular  opinion  might
argue  is  the  following  trial,  in  which  the  German
Highest Court came to a conclusion that was contrary
to the popular moral sentiment. The Daschner crim-
inal trial concerned the former deputy police chief of
Frankfurt, Wolfgang Daschner, who threatened Mag-
nus Gaefgen, the suspect who had already confessed
to the kidnapping of a boy, with torture if he would
not reveal the boy's location. In the criminal proced-
ure against the deputy police chief, the court came
to  the  conclusion  that  human  dignity  (Article  1
paragraph 1 sentence 1 German Grundgesetz) is an
untouchable principle without exception, which cor-
responds with the absolute prohibition of torture of
Article  3  European  Charter  of  Human  Rights  [24].
This case resulted in a heated discussion about the
permissibility of 'rescue torture', a variant of the tick-
ing bomb scenario, among scholars, the German press
and the German public [25].
All the above cases have in common that due to
different conceptions underlying the same label ('hu-
man  rights')  a  fierce  disagreement  within  even  the
same state occurred. It seems that the legal concep-
tions  underlying  the  argument  of  universality  have
changed  to  that  extent  that  common  moral  senti-
ments cannot consent to the results of law application
in extreme cases. The limits of a semantic incompatib-
ility  of  human  rights  with  general  ethical  beliefs
become apparent in these cases. That the fault lines
of this disagreement open up between the wider, not
legally  trained  public,  politicians  with  certain  re-
sponses in mind, and human rights lawyers suggests
that human rights have emerged as a fairly specific
kind of ethical norms within a legal culture that does
not always correspond with the public opinion about
morality and by extension of how law should work.
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This is, however, not the whole story. People might
disagree in these extreme cases where human rights
seem to violate utilitarian moral logics, but such logics
come  under  attack  where  the  level  of  cruelty,  the
systematic nature of the deed and its proportions are
clearer as with torture in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo
Bay. In other words,  there seems to be some con-
sensus concerning the existence of very basic moral
principles. This is not to say that there is consensus
on the justifications applicable to deviate from moral
principles such as: what constitutes the greater good,
avoiding  a  terrorist  attack  by  retrieving  information
from suspects through torture or not living in a society
in which  torture  is  the  sword of  Damocles  hanging
over  everyone's  head who might  be  identified as a
potential  bearer  of  valuable  information?  The  next
section will discuss moral universalism and relativism
to  shed  some  light  on  what  could  constitute  the
universal  core  and  what  the  relativist  elements  of
human rights.
3. Language and Morals
One can distinguish between two contrary theoretical
positions  regarding  ethical  norms,  moral  principles
and  cultures  which  one  can  label  'radical  cultural
relativism' and 'radical universalism'. The former sees
culture as the sole source of validity of a moral right
or wrong, while the latter holds that cultural perspect-
ives are irrelevant to moral validity as moral principles
are universally valid [26]. The radical cultural relativ-
ist's  main argument claims that  there are no rights
that everyone is entitled to equally because humans
are  different  [27].  The  following  explanatory  argu-
ment underlies this ethical relativism: people differ in
their basic moral beliefs; "there are or there can be no
value  judgements  that  are  true,  that  is,  objectively
justifiable independent of specific cultures" ([28],  p.
782); "in every case the rightness of any act or good-
ness of anything for a member of culture A is justified
by  reference  to  what  in  fact  is  considered  right  or
good in culture A" ([28], p. 786). Radical cultural re-
lativists, therefore, deny common values that all cul-
tures share, such as human rights. In response Don-
nelly  argued,  that  "if  human  nature  were  infinitely
variable, or if moral values were determined solely by
culture, there could be no human rights (rights that
one  has  "simply  as  human  being")  because  the
concept of "human being" would have no specificity of
moral  significance"  [29].  Radical  universalism  essen-
tially turns these arguments around, claiming that all
humans are the same and therefore the same moral
principles apply to everyone. The reasons can range
from natural law, to a Humean inherent moral sense
[30], to rational Kantian reasoning [31], or combining
moral sentiments with rational reasoning [32].
In between these two extremes, one can locate two
branches of moral philosophy that argue for a middle
path and agree on some degree of commonness: 'weak
cultural relativism' and  'soft moral universalism'. Don-
nelly advocated weak cultural relativism as an explana-
tion that integrates both the 'undeniable fact' of cultural
relativism  and  the  universality  of  some  norms  by
resorting to the human rights discourse as follows:
"Rights held equally by all against the state, both
limiting its legitimate range of actions and requiring
positive  protections  against  certain  predictable
economic, social, and political contingencies, are a
seemingly  natural  and  necessary  response  to
typically modern threats to human dignity, to basic
human values, traditional and modern alike" [33].
Donnelly's  approach,  which he later  terms "func-
tional  universality"  attributes  universality  of  ethical
norms to the fact that the same constraints are being
posed to the individual in the modern state. Moreover,
when  using  the  terms  'human  dignity' and  'basic
human values' he assumes that there is indeed some
commonness to be found. The mere fact that modern
states  pose similar  threats  does  not  yet  mean that
similar values are threatened. Thus, this perspective is
only  plausible  if  these  similar  threats  are  directed
against similar values. This means a necessary pre-
sumption of same threats is that people are the same
in what can be threatened in the first place. Earlier in
his writings Donnelly, however, seems to suggest that
the principle of human dignity is to some extent uni-
versal but realized in different ways [18]. This socio-
legal perspective in his earlier writing does not come
back in Donnelly's 2007 article The Relative Universal-
ity  of  Human Rights  and the  following debate  with
Goodhart, which discusses a wide range of different
forms  of  universality  (functional,  legal  international,
overlapping  consensus,  anthropological,  and  ontolo-
gical universality of human rights) [34-36]. However,
exactly  the  commonness  of  human  faculty  is  what
seems  to  be  the  initiating  factor  for  social  norm-
creation as will be elaborated in Section 5.
Soft  moral  universalism  assumes  that  there  are
some  basic  moral  principles  that  are  shared  by  all
cultures such as human dignity or the prohibition of
murder, but also assumes that different cultures may
apply  or  ensure  these  principles  differently.  When
looking into diverse cultures at various points in times,
some scholars found that there are some basic prin-
ciples that where valid in all cultures. Gert and Lewis
described  a  set  of  common  moral  principles  one
might regard as universal  (and which will  illustrate
how  the  use  of  labels  and  categories  leads  to  a
semantic incompatibility, but not a factual one). Fol-
lowing  Gert's  account  of  universal  moral  principles
there are ten norms the violation of which without
justification  is  universally  prohibited  as  immoral
action (see Table 1).
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Table 1. Gert's ten universal moral principles [37].
1. Do not kill. 2. Do not cause pain.
3. Do not disable. 4. Do not deprive of freedom.
5. Do not deprive of pleasure. 6. Do not deceive.
7. Keep your promises. 8. Do not cheat.
9. Obey the law. 10. Do your duty.
Table 2. Lewis' illustration of the Tao [38].
1. The Law of General Beneficence: 'I have 
not caused hunger. I have not caused 
weeping.' (Ancient Egyptian. ERE v. 478)
2. The Law of Special Beneficence: 'Part of us 
is claimed by our country, part by our parents, 
part by our friends.' (Roman. Ibid. i. vii)
a. Duties to Parents, Elders, Ancestors
b. Duties to Children and Posterity
3. The Law of Justice
a. Sexual Justice: 'Thou shalt not commit 
adultery.'
b. Honesty: 'Has he drawn false boundaries?' 
(Babylonian. List of Sins. ERE v. 446)
c. Justice in Court, &C.
4. The Law of Good Faith and Veracity
‘A sacrifice is obliterated by a lie and the merit 
of alms by an act of fraud.' (Hindu. Janet, i. 6)
5. The Law of Mercy [37]: 'You will see them 
take care of... widows, orphans, and old 
men, never reproaching them.' (Redskin. ERE
v. 439)
6. The Law of Magnanimity: 'There are two 
kinds of injustice: the first is found in those 
who do an injury, the second in those who fail 
to protect another from injury when they can.' 
(Roman. Cicero, De Off. I. vii)
In a similar way, but more on the level of principles,
Lewis distils eight principles of natural law, which he
calls Tao, out of 119 examples (covering Australian Ab-
origines, Native Americans, Christian, Hindu, Chinese,
Norse, Egyptian, Greek, Jewish, Roman, Germanic, and
other  traditions)  that  all  cultures  can  account  for
without known exception (see Table 2).
The difference between Gert's and Lewis' account
of universal norms might at first sight be interpreted
as an argument against universality as such. Both try
to prove the same point but  come to different  cat-
egories, which seem hardly compatible, because they
categorize  elements  of  the  same  object  of  inquiry
('social  interaction')  into  other  categories  of  moral
principles. Gert formulates a prohibiting norm in the
form of a commandment ("Do not cause pain!"). The
physiological  and psychological  makeup of  a human
being that enables it to experience pain is implicitly
assumed in both accounts. Lewis chooses not to for-
mulate the norm in the form of a prohibition against
the vice of cruelty, but in a commandment in the form
of the virtue of general beneficence.
When  looking  closer,  the  laws  of  general  and
special beneficence describe Gert's first five norms by
adding a psychological mechanism to it, namely that
there is a difference between the compassion towards
friends, family and strangers. Lewis' laws 3 and 4 do
not appear in a special way in Gert's account as he
does  not  reflect  on  the  difference  between  the
closeness of relationship in the first place. The law of
justice relates to the principle 'obey the law' and 'do
your  duty'.  And  finally,  good  faith  and  veracity  are
reflected in keeping promises, not cheating and not
deceiving. Magnanimity and mercy are, according to
Gert, virtues that more describe the moral identity of
a  person than a  moral  principle  ([37],  pp.  76–79).
Most of all, the reason for coming to different categor-
ies  and  labels  might  be  that  Lewis  includes  an
element intrinsic to social behaviour that Gert blends
out, namely the difference of compassion depending
on the specific  relationships involved. It  is  the phe-
nomenon that in moral terms we do not only differen-
tiate between me and the other but also between me,
people  that  I  am  close  to  and  the  other.  This  is
expressed by  the  law of  special  beneficence,  which
does not only relate to one's own preferences that we
have in fulfilling moral obligations towards people who
are emotionally closer to us.  It  seems to be also a
bigger principle that a judging observer applies when
(s)he  sees  a  violation  of  moral  principles  regarding
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two actors that are either close to each other or not.
This  changes also the perception of  severity  of  the
breach of  a moral  principle  [40].  The expression of
special beneficence is not so much manifest in Human
Rights Law (protection of the family and rights of the
child merely acknowledge the specific importance of
the family in social life and the increased vulnerability
of  children).  It  is,  however,  commonly found as  an
attribute in criminal law (e.g. different punishment for
perpetrators who misused a relationship of trust). Also
general  beneficence exists regarding people that  do
not  belong  to  the  in-group  quite  commonly,  for
example  as  the  principle  hospitality  in  international
legal discourse since Vitoria [41]. A modern view of
Human  Rights  and  particularly  the  concept  of  the
Responsibility to Protect seem to also confirm growing
international acknowledgement of general beneficence
not  only  as  a  moral  but  also  as an emerging legal
duty.
Looking  at  common  principles  it  is  immediately
apparent that (1) all principles mentioned by Gert and
Lewis  relate  to  social  interaction,  which  is  also  the
field of  culture, and that  (2) most  of  the principles
mentioned relate directly or indirectly to the causation
or the prevention of  harm. Concerning (2), Linklater
found that the principle of harm follows similar narrat-
ives across cultures because of the universality of the
human condition to experience pain, which puts cruelty,
i.e. causing harm without justification and simply for
the sake of making someone suffer, to rank highest in
the  vices  one  can  commit  [42].  Harm and  multiple
general forms of how it can be inflicted through com-
mission  and  omission  reside  in  the  psychology  and
physiology that compose together the human condition
and its ability to experience suffering.
Next to that, some norms shape a basic structure
of what communities in general need to be able to
survive as communities (Gert: 6–10; Lewis: 2, 4, 5,
6). Norms such as veracity and justice are considered
universal, not because they are relevant for individual
survival, but for group survival. Social groups require
some degree of trust and/or control to benefit from
the advantages of cooperation among its members.
If the object of inquiry changes only marginally, it
can happen that many implicit assumptions change as
well  or  are added. Let us assume for now that the
norm of general beneficence is based on the same as-
sumptions as the prohibition of causing pain, namely
the  physiological  and  psychological  makeup  of  a
human being's ability to experience suffering.  If  we
compare  this  norm with  its  equivalent  norm in  the
Universal  Declaration  of  Human Rights  (UDHR),  we
find  in  the  latter  that  many  more  assumptions  are
tacitly added: "No one shall be subjected to torture or
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or  punish-
ment" (Article  5). The basic assumptions that make
the breach of this norm possible are the same  (the
human ability to experience pain). The difference lies
not in the offence but in the formulation of the Article
5 and the logic of the UDHR as such. General benefi-
cence and the prohibition of causing pain concern a
perpetrator and the offence, and are valid independ-
ently from the culture in which they happen (as long
as  we  do  not  include  justifications).  These  general
moral  principles  derive  directly  from  a  violation  of
human  integrity.  Therefore,  they  do  not  assume  a
conception of  individual  rights  and freedoms or,  for
example, structures where norms oblige or give rights
to  communities  instead  of  individuals.  That  means
they do not contain secondary (executive) norms of
how the violation relates to the victim with regards to
rights. They only relate to the perpetrator in the form
of a duty. Compliance mechanisms are also omitted.
In the UDHR's view "no one" refers to an individual
right of a subject to such a treatment (which is more
clearly expressed in Article 2: "Everyone is entitled to
all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declara-
tion…"). Thereby, the same norm implies much more
in the latter  case by adding the concept  of  entitle-
ment.  It  additionally  tacitly  assumes that  the  same
human  is  equipped  with  rights  and  freedoms  that
stem  from  its  individuality.  Thus,  the  shift  from
obliging the duty bearer to give rights to an individual
is  a step that changes the object of inquiry from a
moral principle stemming from basic physiological and
psychological  experiences  of  pain  to  the  rights  of
human  beings  as  individualized  entities.  It  further-
more assumes that  humans are entitled to exercise
these rights and freedoms against a state entity with
corresponding duties.
Therefore, in the light of the discussion above one
can see that semantic incompatibilities do not  neces-
sarily result in factual incompatibilities concerning the
protected value.  However,  as soon as additional  as-
sumptions (about the rights/duty relationship between
rights-holder  and  duty-bearer;  the  relation  between
state, groups and individuals; the forms of suffering;
the relationship between in- and out-groups) are im-
plicitly introduced, one creates norms that presuppose
certain  cultural-normative  structures.  This  is  what
always  happens  in  social  norm-creation  and  which
creates the impression that  there is  no universality.
Nevertheless, the underlying reason for creating the
norms  "Do  not  cause  pain"/General  beneficence/
Article 5 UDHR is originally the same and universal—
to protect people from harm. Thus, language has two
effects:  (α)  using  different  categories  and  labels
seemingly  leads  to  an  incompatibility  based  on  se-
mantics; and (β)  attaching tacit  procedural and cul-
tural assumptions leads to a real incompatibility. The
next section differentiates between principles that can
claim universality and the tacit procedural and cultural
assumptions  leading  to  culturally  specific  ethical
norms.
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4. Cultural Specificity of Ethics
Since Maslow many scholars have attested that needs
can create an impetus for human motivation (see for
example [43-45]; [46]). One can essentially summarize
that when people feel that their needs are threatened,
this dominates their behaviour. My hypothesis in this
regard is that the violation of fundamental needs leads
people  to  identify  moral  principles.  I  use  the  term
'fundamental needs' to avoid the postulate of a biolo-
gical essentialism, which would be caused by using the
Maslowian term 'basic needs'. Maslow himself doubted
that  the  hierarchical  structure  of  needs  reflects  an
order of importance of needs to the individual consider-
ing the fact that people go on hunger strike for their
beliefs, i.e. are willing to risk physiological (basic) need
fulfilment  for  psychological  or  transcendental  needs
[43].  'Fundamental  needs'  mean to  reflect  the  fulfil-
ment of needs necessary to human faculty and without
which  life  cannot  thrive  sustainably.  In  this  sense
transcendental  needs  (the  need  for  an  overarching
framework that helps the individual to make sense of
the  world)  are  just  as  fundamental  as  the need for
food,  shelter  and  love.  With  the  inclusion  of
transcendental needs one however includes philosoph-
ical  frameworks,  such  as  religions  which  are  highly
culturalized.  Fundamental  about  it  is  then  not  the
specific world view itself, but the need for such a world
view whatever shape it might take (philosophy, religion
etc.).  One  experiences  this  fundamental  nature  of
transcendental needs when ideas and events cannot be
explained  by  one's  current  world  view  and  thus
threaten the very fabric of one's sanity if one does not
modify her/his world view.
Therefore,  although  the  violation  of  fundamental
needs is universally comprehensible in the same way,
different mechanisms evolved in different cultures and
social groups to ensure the fulfilment of these needs
leading  to  a  differentiation  of  expression  of  safety
needs.  Furthermore,  higher  value  is  attributed  to
value categories of subsistence of fundamental needs
than  to  object  categories  that  ensure  survival  to  a
lesser degree. These value categories of subsistence
differ from culture to culture because they are based
on different forms of survival. An example can illus-
trate the basic problem with regard to different value
categories  of  subsistence  and  how  it  links  to
fundamental physiological needs: Stealing is forbidden
in every culture. However the punishment for stealing
varies. Stealing a cow in Western Europe nowadays
might  be  seen  as  a  petty  crime  punished  with  a
relatively low sentence in comparison to the punish-
ment that would result from the same act in a Muslim
South Sudanese herding community (e.g. cutting off
limbs) [47]. The difference in the punishment can be
explained by the difference in what a cow means for
the  fulfilment  of  fundamental  needs  in  one  or  the
other community and culture. Thus, the same object
(the  cow)  falls  in  the  South  Sudanese  case  into  a
value  category  of  subsistence  higher  in  the  value
hierarchy than it is placed in Western European cul-
tures, although all do agree that it is a wrongdoing.
Stealing a cow in Western Europe threatens the sur-
vival of the community less than in a South Sudanese
herding community.
Cultural specificity is also reproduced in language.
Some philosophers see herein an absolute hurdle.  I
will,  however,  elaborate that  there are common de-
nominators that allow overcoming this problem. Hud-
son's example of a small party of Martians coming to
earth telling people what they ought to do illustrates
the argument of some philosophers that we would not
recognize an alien moral discourse as moral discourse,
because  the  depth  grammar  of  Martians  would  be
fundamentally different to ours. According to Wittgen-
stein's  theory  of  surface  and  depth  grammar,  lan-
guage is woven into our lives and our culture. There-
fore, the argument continues,  we would not under-
stand the depth grammar (telling us that if "x is red"
one assumes that x is an object with the physical at-
tributes of 'red' that are visible to the normal sighted)
underlying a Martian moral discourse [48]. My argu-
ment is that although language is woven into life and
by  extension  into  culture,  the  ultimate  determinant
and presumption of language is social interaction and
therefore life itself. If moral is "what prevents harm to
life",  then  one  assumes  that  "harm  to  life  can  be
caused by depriving life of fundamental needs". This
is universally valid to all forms of human life and alien
life  to  the  extent  of  the  similarity  of  fundamental
needs  and  under  the  condition  that  the  Martians
possess the faculty of rational reflection.
Without  a  social  counterpart  language  is  not
necessary and without the concept of life morality has
no  meaning  in  a  discourse.  This  becomes  evident
when trying to come up with examples that try to dis-
prove this assumption, e.g.: what is the moral prop-
erty of disassembling an inanimate object that nobody
is emotionally attached to and that serves no purpose
to  individuals  and  or  social  groups?  This  question
becomes a moral question only once a sentient being
fosters  any kind of  relationship  to  that  object.  The
moral question becomes then whether the effect  of
disassembling the inanimate object leads to negative
effects for the sentient being or a group. Most basic
and thus universally understandable moral discourses
can  therefore  be said  to  have  at  least  'life'  as  the
universally  common  reference  point,  and  in  their
prescriptive  form  the  prohibition  to  harm  life  by
prohibiting privation of fundamental needs necessary
to  sustain  life.  This  means  that  if  the  Martian  dis-
course was indeed about morality, then 'life' and the
violation  of  it  through  causing  harm  would  also
feature in their moral discourse as a reference point,
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at least  when talking about their  most  fundamental
moral  principles.  Because  we  share  this  reference
point, we would recognize their discourse as a moral
discourse  notwithstanding  that  we  might  disagree
about  the  outcome of  their  ethical  reasoning.  Sug-
gesting  that  moral  discourse  can  ultimately  (with
regard to the reference point 'life' and by extension
fundamental  needs)  always  be  recognized  as  such
does not imply that all facets of a Martian ethical reas-
oning  would  disclose themselves  to  our  comprehen-
sion. Because of a different depth grammar we might
be unable to recognize a Martian moral discourse with
regard to cultural specificities (e.g. if there were no
concept of property in Martian culture, there would be
no concept of stealing). Parallel to the punishment of
theft of a cow in the South Sudanese herding com-
munity case, the elaborations on depth grammar also
help  to  distinguish  ethical  norms  from  moral  prin-
ciples. The moral principles recognizable in a Martian
discourse  would  be  those  that  relate  to  harm  by
depriving of fundamental needs in various derivative
forms of action (e.g. the act of stealing what someone
needs to fulfil fundamental needs). The ethical norms
reflect  the culturalized  specificities  of  social  interac-
tion, compliance mechanisms, ways in which a group
ensures  that  fundamental  rights  are  protected,  and
the hierarchy of  values that  determines the propor-
tionality between violation of a prohibition, appropri-
ate defence against such a violation and punishment.
In the South Sudanese case ethical norms would be
the value  that  livestock  represents,  the  punishment
attributed to stealing livestock, and the enforcement
mechanisms attached.
I suggest that the more a moral discourse diversi-
fies and departs from the common points of reference
'life' and fundamental needs, which make life possible
and sustainable, and moves on to culturally coloured
specificities of social life (diminutive derivations, e.g.
social integrity, honour, property, importance of family,
etcetera),  the more depth grammar makes different
cultures  unable  to  recognize  that  the  other's  moral
discourse and ethical reasoning is based on the same
moral principles. The same mechanism of cultural col-
oration  would  make  moral  discourses  between  cul-
tures that recognize different value hierarchies on top
of the commonly shared value of life potentially in-
compatible. This becomes particularly apparent when
looking at the order of value hierarchies. The question
"is it justifiable to kill, inflict physical or psychological
pain, offend or not to do anything if one's honour is
violated?" results in different answers depending on
the culture  that  is  asked.  The social  mechanism of
honour developed in some societies as a social mech-
anism to prevent  crimes, while  in  others to protect
one's  honour  was  not  necessary.  This  can  be  ex-
plained by evolutionary psychology: "A key element of
cultures of  honor  is  that  men in these cultures are
prepared to protect with violence the reputation for
strength  and toughness.  Such cultures  are  likely  to
develop where (1) a man's resources can be thieved
in full  by other men and (2) the governing body is
weak and thus cannot prevent or punish theft" ([49],
pp. 48–49,51). To see honour as a value embedded in
the  social  context  helps  understand  how  depth
grammar might prevent members of one culture from
understanding  the  actions  of  another  culture  as
ethical.
How the respect for the other is expressed takes an
even stronger cultural coloration. A female American
student  accompanying  her  professor  on  a  field  re-
search through Islam expressed on one occasion her
anger  about  an  Islamic  scholar  they  interviewed,
because he would not even have the audacity to look
in her eyes when talking to her. Her professor, familiar
with both cultures, explained that the Islamic scholar,
in accordance with his cultural expression of honour,
would have dishonoured her by looking into her eyes
[50].  In traditional  Japanese culture  honour was of
highest  importance  and  connected  strongly  with
loyalty. For example, the Hagakure (the code of the
samurai)  describes  how 36 samurai  wanted to give
their lives (seppuku) to honour their deceased master
and show their  loyalty.  The clan leader,  Mitsushige,
heard of it and issued a decree that seppuku to show
loyalty  beyond  life  would  be  dishonourable  and
disloyal [51]. If such abiding loyalty as a value is alien
to another culture, it has a hard time understanding
the ethical rationale of the 36 samurai and it might
simply call it craziness. Loyalty and subordination to
superiors  in  traditional  Japanese  culture,  however,
were the foundation to the functioning of this society.
Loyalty was not blind, but it also demanded from the
samurai to tell his master if he was wrong, even if the
samurai  would be punished for  it.  In that  way, the
values of  loyalty and courage to do the right  thing
enabled stability  of  the societal  structures,  which is
why  loyalty  and  courageous  integrity  cannot  be
separated from each other  in  the Japanese  context
without  having  destabilizing  effects  on  the  social
system.  This  further  indicates  that  fundamental
needs  of  life  might  be  at  the  centre  of  moral
principles, but also that the functioning of the social
system and the survival of the social group are at the
heart  of  ethical  reasoning,  bearing  the  distinction
between the two in mind.
As one can see with the example of honour, the
role and place of values in the value hierarchy of a
society  enables  its  members  to  make  conscious
choices  about  moral  questions  concerning  the  ra-
tionale  of  their  deeds in  accordance  with what  the
society  would  accept.  This  hierarchy  of  values  is
inherent in all principled moral arguments, and also in
the  previously  discussed value  of  the  prohibition  of
torture. The Human Rights Committee made the value
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hierarchies  that  guide  the  logics  concerning  torture
explicit  in  is  General  Comment  20  on  Article  7
International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights
(ICCPR):
"The text of article 7 allows of no limitation. The
Committee also reaffirms that, even in situations of
public  emergency  such  as  those  referred  to  in
article 4 of the Covenant, no derogation from the
provision of article 7 is allowed and its provisions
must  remain  in  force.  The  Committee  likewise
observes  that  no  justification  or  extenuating
circumstances may be invoked to excuse a violation
of article 7 for any reasons, including those based
on  an  order  from  a  superior  officer  or  public
authority" [52].
The only reason of why human rights treaties were
established  in  this  way  was  given  in  a  very  short
sentence in General  Comment 7:  "Its  purpose is  to
protect  the  integrity  and  dignity  of  the  individual"
[53]. What remains implicit is the reason why dignity
trumps life concerning torture in all circumstances. For
finding out what reasons could be put forward, one
would have to study the relevant case law and the
materials  to  Article  5  UDHR  and  Article  7  ICCPR
respectively.
We  have  now  established  that  the  norms  we
discuss in ethical discourse are culturally specific ex-
pressions of  moral  principles  coloured by the depth
grammar  of  a  specific  culture,  which  I  call  'ethical
norms'. I refer to 'moral principles' as those that can
be considered universally common to all people and
universally  recognized  as  belonging  to  moral  dis-
courses—the tacit presuppositions of life itself, i.e. the
ability  to  suffer  (physiologically,  psychologically  or
transcendentally) and to die or to lose the will to live
as a cause of deprivation of fundamental needs. As
soon as language is involved, moral principles become
immediately tainted by cultural specificities, the order
of values in the value hierarchy, by assumptions about
how a social group ensures its survival,  and by the
relation between rights and duties as well as between
individuals and the social group.
Habermas' term of discourse ethics takes a similar
meaning with regard to ethics in the sense of a result
of  communicative  action  on  which  discourses  are
superimposed.  Habermas  assumes  that  moralities
coincide because linguistic action is the source of and
the  solution  to  mutual  vulnerabilities  of  socialized
persons. In a discourse,  the more exacting form of
communication, he sees the potential of universalizing
moral  principles  beyond  the  provincial  limits  of
particular forms of  life [54].  Habermas himself  calls
this a scaling down of the categorical imperative to a
universality agreeable to all parties in the discourse (a
biggest  common denominator)  ([54],  pp.  201–202).
However,  Habermas'  argument  of  an  agreeable
universality  works only,  if  one assumes that,  as  for
example concerning human rights, there is a common
denominator such as found in  a priori existent moral
principles deriving from fundamental needs. Because
under the conditions set forth by different cultures to
ensure  these  principles  for  the  society  in  manifold
ways, language has two more effects: (γ) it connects
ethical  discourses and makes them potentially com-
patible within the same social group that shares the
tacit cultural assumptions; (δ) it also separates differ-
ent  cultures  from each  other  because  they  do  not
share  these  assumptions  and  the  depth  grammar
would indeed result in the Martian dilemma. If there
were no common moral principles, different cultures
might try to negotiate, but they would never find a
common ground. That agreement about human rights
is  possible,  is  the  effect  of  a  priori existent  moral
principles that derive from the human condition and
fundamental needs.
In  summary,  a  priori universality  of  the  moral
principles is given only in an early stage of when the
moral  norm  is  identified.  This  a  priori universality
derives  from the human condition  of  being able  to
experience pain and suffering (through the privation
of  fundamental  needs)  and  ultimately  to  die.  After
that  initial  stage  of  identifying  the  relevant  moral
principle,  ergo as soon as discourse starts, language
attaches  many  cultural  specific  elements  to  these
principles. Most of them remain tacitly assumed. Fur-
thermore,  executive  norms  are  attached  to  ensure
compliance  with  the  norm.  These  executive  norms
incorporate  societal  structures  and  the  respective
hierarchy of values. Once we reach this stage, we find
a fully developed ethical norm as demonstrated with
Article 5 UDHR in the previous section. This section
used  the  concept  of  honour  to  explain  the  value
hierarchies that are implicitly attached by cultures. It
showed that these assumptions remain just as implicit
in the Human Rights Committee's General Comments
concerning torture.
The  next  section  gives  a  sociological  account  to
social norm-creation and continues on to a different
form of universality (through universal acceptance—a
posteriori) that can be achieved through international
discourse—legal universality.
5. Connecting Needs, Empathy and Morality
With regard to depth grammar one might raise the
question of what are, as Wittgenstein calls it, the tacit
presuppositions of life and culture in moral discourse
([55], p. 197). Being part of the language game, such
tacit  presuppositions  are  assumptions  of  cognition
that  do  not  need  to  be  expressed  in  order  to  be
understood. Describing the scene of a patient and a
doctor Wittgenstein explains that depending on whether
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it is a scene in a play or a psychology book our under-
standing changes: "If this experiment were described
in the same way in a book on psychology, then the
behaviour  described  would  be  understood  as  the
expression  of  something  mental  just  because  it  is
presupposed that the subject is not taking us in, has
not learnt the replies by heart, and other things of the
kind" ([55], pp. 179–180, Section V). In similar terms
when  talking  about  ethics  tacit  presuppositions  are
constantly present, those about what constitutes life
and  those  about  what  constitutes  the  norm  in  a
culture. E.g. for stealing a cow his limb was cut off.
The tacit presupposition of life is twofold in this case;
both the cutting off of the limb is an infringement of
life, and so must be the deed of stealing for which the
retribution was cast. The tacit presupposition of cul-
ture in social life is the proportionality of the retribu-
tion in relation to the deed, the value hierarchy that
relates to stealing of a cow and cutting off of limbs,
and the  assumption  of  an  ethical  system of  norms
regulating both the idea of property and the relation
between actors. These tacit presuppositions thus rest
on assumptions connected with the object of investig-
ation, and ethics is the language game to form rules
based on the tacit presuppositions of life and culture.
One tacit presupposition is revealed by the use of
the word 'good' in all discourses. 'Good', or as War-
nock  translates  it  "human  happiness  or  interests,
needs, wants, or desires" ([48], p. 59), is obviously
something  that  all  moral  discourses  are  concerned
with. The tacit presuppositions we do all have in com-
mon  is  the  fact  that  life  in  order  to  be  sustained
requires the fulfilment of fundamental needs. Another
tacit presupposition of moral discourse is the fact that
life can only be sustained in social interaction, which
happens  among humans to a large degree through
speech-acts.  Thereby,  language  becomes  indispens-
able for the creation of a complex of moral principles,
ethical norms and value hierarchies.
In terms of  social norm-creation, if there were no
conception of the wrongness of depriving somebody
of his life without justification, human life would be
without protection and open to attack any time. Since
human life is, however, not possible without mutual
social exchange, i.e. a society of humans, trust of not
being killed by anyone randomly is a prerequisite of
any society. Furthermore, since social norm-creation is
a  social  process  and  the  human  being  is  socially
embedded and dependent on the other members of
the  group,  one  possible  justification  of  killing  is
logically when the existence of the larger group is at
stake.  The  continuation  of  human  existence  in  a
society therefore requires the right to exist as a norm
within this  society.  Likewise the society will  claim a
right to existence and therefore self-defence against
external  threats  as  well  as  individual  members
threatening the social structure that ensures survival.
In order for a group to survive, the first principle of
the preservation of life is not to murder any member
of the group without justification. This does, however,
not preclude that value hierarchies might differ from
culture to culture and that the values inherent in the
justifications for killing a member of the group might
differ.
How  does  social  norm-creation  relate  to  funda-
mental needs? With regard to social interaction one
can postulate the following three points:
a) Actors derive moral principles (primary norms)
from the violation of tacit presuppositions of life itself
reflecting the fulfilment of fundamental physiological,
psychological, and transcendental human needs.
Why  would  actors  derive  moral  principles  from
violations of tacit presuppositions of life? From Adam
Smith's [32]  elaboration on moral  sentiments based
on  sympathy  to  modern  neurological  and  cognition
research,  many  scholars  agree  that  humans  are
equipped with moral faculty based on empathy [56-
59]. There is increasingly evidence that mirror neur-
ones are responsible for empathy. Mirror neurones are
neurones that fire when an individual acts and also
when it observes action. Interestingly, originally attrib-
uted to the acquisition of both language and grammar,
mirror neurones seem to be also largely responsible
for  empathy  with  the  suffering  of  others  and  the
imitation learning of moral principles as well (see for
example [60,61]).  In  layman's  terms, observing the
suffering of others results in mirror neurons firing in
the brain of the observer and thereby resulting in em-
pathic compassion.
b) By abstraction  based on these  higher  ranking
principles (a) a group can envision certain actions as
threatening  to  its  own  existence,  which  leads  the
members to engage in ethical discourse and to formu-
late  prescriptive  norms  (e.g.  protection  of  life,
prohibition of harm, prohibition of stealing).
It is only natural that within social groups the drive
to avoid both direct and indirect experience of harm
will  result  in  the  exchange  of  opinions  on  how  to
achieve  this.  This  results  in  what  Habermas  terms
'discursive  action' trying  to  formulate  principles  of
harm prevention. At the same time, how to ensure the
preservation of life and the fulfilment of needs would
strongly  depend  on  how groups  learned  to  survive
together efficiently. This can be different based on the
value categories of  subsistence present in a culture
resulting by and large from different cultural systems
and  technologies  of  production,  the  availability  of
sources of need fulfilment (food etc.), and the form of
government  and  procedural  order  guiding  the  soci-
ety's  dispute  settlement  and  norm  enforcement.
Therefore,  one  would  learn  different  ethics  in  one
culture than in another.
c)  In order to protect moral principles  (a) through
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these  ethical  norms  (b)  from  future  violations  the
group creates secondary norms ensuring compliance,
i.e. norms that regulate the relation among individual
members  and between the  group and its  individual
members (in the form of obligations or rights of the
group and/or of the individual).
Eventually,  discourses  about  human  rights  have
long  ago  transcended  the  nation  state  through
globalization,  informal  pressure  by  non-state  actors
with  the  aim to  protect  human rights  and  through
states  agreeing  upon  common laws  in  the  form of
international covenants on human rights. This univer-
sal agreement was already discussed above. But now
it becomes apparent that the moral a priori universal-
ity in this last stage has diminished and made room
for  a  legal  a  posteriori  universality  based  on  the
international  discourse  between  states.  In  this  last
step,  as  observed  above  with  the  Gaefgen  torture
case  and  the  plane  shooting  debated  in  Germany,
when  states  agree  upon  principles  to  become
international  law,  there  seems  to  be  a  disconnect
between  the  moral  sentiment  of  the  public  which
remains  in  its  own  sphere  (national,  sub-national,
local). States will have to trade off cultural specificities
that  are  unique  to  the  cultures  they  encompass  in
order to make agreement possible. This compromise
might  be  between  local  cultural  values  and  values
accepted  in  international  law  either  concerning
mechanisms of ensuring survival (such as the role of
the individual vis-à-vis groups and vis-à-vis states), or
concerning  the  content  of  a  norm  in  relation  to
justifications and aggravations.
The  Kantian  idea  that  morality  strives  for  the
highest good, which is an immanent and transcend-
ent,  but  necessary  and  therefore possible  object  of
volition  [62],  as  Kohlberg  interprets,  has  its  own
autonomous sphere. That means that a moral argu-
ment is distinct from other forms of argument as it
uniquely establishes the tacit presupposition, which by
the  very  nature  of  moral  discourse  asks  questions
about the relation between sentient  beings and the
effect of an event or act on their fundamental needs,
at  the same time with relation to  the individual  as
well  as  to  the  social  group.  The  question  "Is  it
morally  right?"  [54]  as  Habermas  puts  it  or  the
Kantian "What ought I to do?" has its  autonomous
sphere,  if  we can  agree that  morality  is  ultimately
and minimally always about the reduction or preven-
tion of  harm through any privation of  fundamental
needs.  This  makes  the  discourse  about  morals
recognizable for every culture, but not at the same
time  compatible,  because  the  outcome  of  how  to
ensure  moral  principles  needs  to  be  formed  along
the  lines  that  societal  and  cultural  specificities
require. Looking from this perspective back at Haber-
mas' discourse ethics, it appears that the process of
ethical norm-creation does not necessarily happen in
a  rational  act  of  the  individual  moral  agent  but  is
rather the result of discourse among the members of
a  social  group.  The  perspective  of  the  social
construction  of  ethical  norms  based  on  universal
moral  principles  deriving  from  a  discourse  that
acknowledges fundamental needs of the individual as
member  of  a  group  as  well  as  the  group's  overall
needs  thus  leads  to  highly  specific  and  culturally
coloured  ethical  norms  that  contain:  compliance
mechanisms,  justifications  for  violation,  and
aggravating elements  (circumstances  under which a
violation is worse).
This then seems to also put into perspective that
the  argument  that  liberty  in  the  form of  individual
autonomy constitutes the basic principle of morals is a
highly  culturally  embedded  argument  (see  for
example [63,64]).  Because individualistic  liberty and
rights are but one way of ensuring fundamental needs,
another would be via group obligations towards the
individual  in  mutual  correspondence  with  individual
duties  towards  the  group.  This  has  been illustrated
with the non-Western critique to Human Rights above.
Thus  individual  liberty  is  just  one form of  ensuring
basic moral principles and not a basic moral principle
by itself. It is an ethical norm, more exactly an execut-
ive norm, describing the relation between members of
the community and the community itself, because it is
a culturally specific mechanism that derives from the
value hierarchies the community established. Follow-
ing this perspective allows for natural law and positive
law to exist in parallel as long as natural law remains
a subject of need fulfilment and harm prevention, and
positive law belongs to the area of ethical discourse
about secondary and executive norms, i.e. culturally
specific mechanisms to ensure these basic principles.
Figure  1  illustrates  the  here  presented  account  of
bridging  moral  universality  and  legal universality via
cultural pluralism: the path from an offence against an
individual or a group of individuals, via identification of
the  associated  moral  norm in  different  social  groups
(local and national), the attaching of culturally specific
elements  (compliance  mechanisms,  justifications  and
aggravating factors), which results in ethical norms and
the  negotiation  on  the  formulation  of  ethical  norms
internationally and the necessary trade-offs to come to
an agreement. In between the boxes the mechanisms
empathy,  national/local  discourse  and  international
discourse that have been discussed above are indicated.
International agreement found that the prohibition
of  torture  would  have  to  become  an  absolute
prohibition in order to protect the inviolable dignity of
the human being.  This  led over the years to many
different  international  laws  (Article  5  UDHR  1948,
Article 7 ICCPR 1966, Torture Convention 1984, Art.
7(1)f, 8(2)a/ii Rome Statute 1998). If this happens
in a public debate and the national authorities feel
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Figure 1. Socio-legal framework bridging moral and legal universality via cultural pluralism.
Figure 2. Process of re-evaluation of torture regulations within the socio-legal framework.
obliged to continue to comply with international law
previously accepted, they will face criticism from those
who  support  'rescue-torture'.  If  national  authorities
would follow the rescue-torture argument, they might
detach themselves from the international norm. This
would  cause  a  debate  with  the  adherents  to  the
internationally agreed norms (both within the country
and internationally). In other words, social norm-cre-
ation might result  in a re-evaluation in extreme cir-
cumstances and in effect might reduce de facto legal
universality.
The  Daschner case caused the German society to
re-evaluate the value hierarchy between the right to
life (of the kidnapped child) and torture (or the threat
of it against Gaefgen to surrender the details of the
child's whereabouts). Furthermore, among the popu-
lation  the  justifications  of  rescue-torture  were  dis-
cussed. If the society would have had the choice and
the state no pre-existing absolute obligations, rescue-
torture might  have become a reality.  A similar  path
can be observed in the United States within govern-
mental circles, where after the tragic events of 9/11
the justifications concerning torture were indeed re-
evaluated. This came to be known as the infamous
torture memos and John Yoo's legal justifications for
why harsh interrogation techniques would not amount
to torture. It resulted in an international debate led by
governments,  the  ICRC,  NGOs,  and  human  rights
activists, who invoked international law and finally led
to a course correction of  the United States.  In this
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case  the  course  correction  came  by  pressure  from
adherents to the international norms but not without
causing  other  governments  (among  others  Poland,
Romania,  Germany)  to  tacitly  support  the  United
States' practices as became evident in the Council of
Europe report "Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlaw-
ful  Inter-State Transfers Involving Council  of Europe
Member States"  [65].  This  reduced the  a posteriori
legal  universality.  Figure 2 illustrates this  within the
elements and processes of the account given in this
essay.
This  socio-legal  account  of  universality  of  moral
principles  and  cultural  specificity  of  ethics  suggest
something else:  despite the fact that  a priori  moral
principles  are  universally  the  same,  cultural  colora-
tions and re-evaluations can lead to the modifications
of value hierarchies (for example from human dignity
to  homeland  security)  that  can  not  only  weaken  a
posteriori  legal  universality,  but  in  extreme  circum-
stances  even  reverse  the  outcome  of  the  ethical
reasoning. This means that moral principles are less
determinative  of  the  outcome  of  ethical  reasoning
than  the  respective  value  hierarchy  applied.  As
paradox as this sounds, one has to consider that the
hierarchy  of  values  determines  the  proportionality
between deed and response.  Thus, while  the moral
principles remain the same (e.g. 'do not unjustifiably
cause harm'), the justification might just tip the scale
in  favour  of  arguing that  a  certain  harm caused is
justified.  Practically  this  can  mean  in  the  case  of
torture  that  if  in  ethical  discourse  issues  such  as
homeland security, individual liberty, the hypothetical
threats  of  terrorism,  and  other  similar  arguments
become  stronger,  value  hierarchies  might  just  be
modified enough to blur the lines between interroga-
tion and torture so much that we can no longer speak
of  an  absolute  prohibition  in  the  sense  of  an  a
posteriori  universality. Figure 2  above shows how re-
evaluation of justifications can diminish the a posteri-
ori universal validity of the prohibition of torture.
6. Conclusion
This article demonstrated that moral universality and
legal universality interact with ethical pluralism. Con-
cerning  moral  universality,  what  connects  human
beings  is  the  principle  that  fundamental  needs  of
individuals  and  of  a  social  community  need  to  be
ensured and that harm to them needs to be preven-
ted.  The  universality  of  this  moral  principle  is  only
inherently present and hardly observable as universal-
ity ends as soon as communities start a discourse on
the different ways in which they want to ensure these
needs. Depending on the culturally specific mechan-
isms (such as the role of duties and/or rights of the
group  and/or  its  individuals)  and  the  diverse  value
categories  of  subsistence,  their  hierarchy  and  the
weight of values are different. I called them culturally
specific  mechanisms,  since  they  pertain  to  social
groups  within  which  through  custom,  practice  and
discourse certain enforcement mechanisms developed.
This might call  for further research on how cultures
and practices  relate to social  mechanisms of  norm-
creation and to the elements of subsistence (farming,
herding  etc.)  certain  social  groups  have  adopted.
There is no doubt that globalization and the interaction
between different social groups, just as much as the
reassembling  of  social  groups  for  different  purposes
(economic, religious, etc.) over the course of human
history makes this task tremendously difficult. This is
particularly  challenging  also  because  every  newly
formed  social  group  will  develop  new  customs
pertaining  to  its  purpose  and  therefore  new  ethical
norms.
From this perspective, what pluralist human rights
debates  actually  criticize  are  not  the  basic  moral
principles  underlying  human  rights  but  (1)  the
culturally  coloured way human rights try to achieve
the  safeguarding  of  fundamental  needs  and  (2)  a
certain hierarchy of values (and their weight) which is
implicitly  introduced.  This  can lead  people  to reject
human rights because they feel that they do not fit
the system of enforcement mechanisms, which their
own social  group has  developed and to which they
have  grown  accustomed.  Thereby  Donnelly's  "func-
tional universality" gets another turn. According to the
elaboration above, moral universality does not primar-
ily derive from the same constraints and the ways of
how to deal with these constraints. It derives from the
most basic reference point of moral discourse being
'life'  and  the  physiological,  psychological  and  tran-
scendental  unity  of  human faculty  with  its  intrinsic
capability to suffer and to have empathy with the suf-
fering of others through the effect of mirror neurones.
This potentially connects every culture due to the use
of  the  same  reference  points:  human  life,  funda-
mental  needs,  and  corresponding  violations.  These
same reference points make a global discourse about
common ethical norms possible.
I have therefore argued for a distinction between
universal  moral  principles  and  ethical  norms.  Moral
principles are universal on the basis of the principal
ability of all humans to physiologically, psychologically
and  transcendentally  experience  suffering.  Ethical
norms  are  culturally  specific  because,  as  soon  as
social  discourse  engages  with  an  offence,  elements
typical to the social group are naturally added through
depth grammar and through discussing enforcement
mechanisms,  justifications,  and  aggravating  factors.
Values and value hierarchies derive from the categor-
ies of objects that  a group requires for subsistence
and from the societal norms that ensure an efficient
social  interaction.  That  means  cultural  values  also
become a subject of ethics, not because they represent
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fundamental  needs of  individuals,  but  because they
ensure  these  fundamental  within  and  for  a  com-
munity. The role of honour was used as an example in
this respect.
Universality can again be reached in  the form of
legal  universality,  which  is  dependent  on  universal
agreement.  That  the  negotiations  and compromises
which led to the formulation of the "universal" Human
Rights  documents  took  place  particularly  among
Western  powers  is  no legal  argument  against  legal
universalism. However, it is a strong political argument
that  derives  from the  fact  that  other  states  joined
these treaties later and without the chance for a re-
negotiation in  relation to the ethical  norms of  their
own cultures. From their perspective, scholars right-
fully  argue  that  human  rights  contain  particularly
culturally coloured secondary norms derived from the
ethical  discourse  of  certain  (mostly  Western)  social
groups. They can never be factually universal as long
as  different  social  groups  have  different  value
hierarchies  and  diverse  mechanisms  of  ensuring
subsistence of individuals and groups. This socio-legal
account  presented  here  does  not  only  explain  the
process from moral universality via ethical pluralism to
legal  universality,  but  also  elucidates  how  and  why
there is just as much disagreement as there is agree-
ment on the universality of human rights. Furthermore,
it  explains  how (and to  some degree why) societies
constantly re-evaluate their relation to these universally
agreed norms and why universal moral principles are
no guaranty for similar outcomes of ethical questions.
This essay raises as many questions as it tries to
answer. It  shows that  there is  a strong relationship
between culture,  traditional  elements  of  subsistence
of social  groups and social  norm-creation. How this
relationship exactly works, however, still remains open
for further research. In addition, the socio-legal frame-
work presented would require further research in the
nature  of  the  offences  that  trigger  re-evaluation  of
established norms. This undertaking might well benefit
from cognitive psychological research on morality and
decision-making. As mentioned in the introduction, this
article  also wants  to prepare the  ground for  further
theoretical  investigations  concerning  an  extended
canon  of  ethical  concepts  commonly  derived  from
virtue ethics. C.S. Lewis' description of universal moral
principles  has  already  highlighted  universal  norms
(magnanimity,  beneficence,  veracity,  good  faith,  and
mercy) that hardly feature in contemporary debates in
political  philosophy,  law  and  international  relations.
Theoretical investigations concerning the universality of
virtues might shed even more light on the socio-legal
function of ethics and the workings of ethical reason-
ing. Additionally, a virtue ethics perspective on interna-
tional  politics  would  also  ask  for  the  study  of  what
constitutes  vices  in  contemporary  legal  and  political
discourses on ethics. 
For the practice of international politics the discus-
sion in this paper shows that the current human rights
system (that includes social, economic, cultural, civil,
and political rights) as well as its enforcement mech-
anisms are indeed not at all suited to accommodate
differences  between  different  legal  cultures  and
approaches  to  compliance  with  prohibitions  against
harming the survival  of  individuals  and groups.  The
mere fact that the conception of human rights focuses
on rights of the individual against the state ignores all
other possible combinations of individuals, groups and
states on the one hand and of rights and duties on
the other. Five possible strategies for advocates of the
current  international  human  right  system  seem  to
emerge from this: (1) top-down: the carrots and stick
approach to convince all states of the current interna-
tional  normative  system;  (2)  bottom-up:  the  soft
power approach to convince local populations of the
importance of individual rights and of the benefits of
this system for their wellbeing; (3) emphasizing those
elements  of  international  human  rights  in  domestic
discourses that are closer to moral principles, i.e. that
are  less  value  laden;  (4)  extending  the  margin  of
appreciation  for  the  interpretation  of  international
human rights norms to facilitate the ease of which the
previous  three  strategies  can  lead  to  a  greatest
common denominator; (5) providing alternative legal
mechanisms  concerning  the  right-duty  and  the
individual-group-state relationship.
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